Public bads are facilities that are necessary for the whole society, but unfortunately, entail negative externalities for the social-economic welfare in the surrounding areas. The main objective of the present thesis is to find optimal locations of two public bads in a region given the preferences of two agents located there. Based on lexmin preference as the joint preference of each of the agents for locating pairs of public bads, the present thesis has defined and proved eleven lemmas determining the implications of strategy-proofness, anonymity and unanimity properties on the decision rule. As an extension to the traditional approach, this thesis has determined complete characterization of a set of strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous rules, and shows that combination of these properties allows for inner solutions for optimal locations of two public bads in an interval given the preferences of the agents in the region.
Introduction
Public bads are facilities that are necessary for the whole society, but unfortunately, entail negative externalities for the social-economic welfare in the surrounding areas. For example, nuclear power plants or disposals of household are typical public bads. It is crucial to identify the most suitable location for a public bad in the related planning process. The main objectives of the present thesis are to find optimal locations of two public bads in a region given the preferences of two agents in the region, to examine the implications of certain properties like strategy-proofness, anonymity and unanimity on the decision rule, and to determine if any combination of these properties allow for any inner solution. As a basic assumption, the considered region is modelled as an interval from 0 to 1 and each agent has an unique point in the interval which is denoted by the dip of the agent. Since negative effects of a public bad on an agent decreases with increasing distance between them, each agent has its single-dipped-preferences and its dip is thus the worst location of any of the two bads for the concerned agent. Preference of an agent to any other point increases as it becomes more distant from its dip. For locating two public bads, it is necessary to consider joint preference for each agent. In this paper, I consider lexmin preference as joint preference. The preference concerning two pairs of location is determined by the distance to the nearer public bad and, in case of a tie that means two locations with the same distance to the nearer public bad, the preference of an agent is determined by its distance to the farer public bad. Furthermore, implications of three properties on the social choice rule are considered, namely strategy-proofness, anonymity and unanimity. Strategy-proofness ensures that unilateral misreporting is not beneficial for the agent, while unanimity implies that if all agents have the same top ranked alternatives, the social choice rule will select them. Anonymity means the outcome of the rule is invariant with respect to the permutation of the agents. Hence, the main tasks of the present thesis are to examine implications of the combination of the concerned three properties on the decision rule and to determine optimal locations of the concerned public bads. The implications of these properties will be analysed in detail and formally proved. The present paper makes use of the proving approach illustrated by Moulin (1980) . In addition, it will be examined under which conditions these properties allow for an inner solution. This methodological approach extends the traditional approach for social choice rules, such as locating one public bad on a line with a strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule (Barbera, 2012) or determining the location of one public bad on some particular region in two dimensional plane (Öztürk et al., 2014) , thereby taking into account finitely many agents. Lastly, another main objective is to define the full characterisation of strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous rules that select inner point. In Gibbard (1973) it is shown that given three or more alternatives, there is no nondictatorial, strategy-proof and Pareto optimal decision rule when the full preference domain is considered. However, in the present thesis only single-dipped preferences is considered and unanimity instead of Pareto optimality is taken into account. The present thesis consists of five sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 describes the model setting. The internal solutions are addressed by Section 3. Section 4 presents the complete characterization of a set of strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous rules for finding inner solutions for optimal locating of the concerned public bads. Finally, Section 5 presents the key findings and concluding statements.
Model
As mentioned in Section 1, the region concerned is modelled by A := [0, 1] . Let N = {i, j} be the set of the agents. It is assumed that the two public bads are symmetric which implies that (a, b) and (b, a) are the same alternatives. Thus, the set of alternatives is
According to the marginal single-dip preference, for any two points, a ∈ A and b ∈ A, a is at least as good as b if |a − x(i)| ≥ |b − x(i)|. If the inequality is strict, then a is strictly preferred to b. Denote R x(i) as the joint weak preference. According to the joint lexmin preference, for all (
Note that the joint preferences of the agents are uniquely identified through the dips. Hence, the domain of the preference profile is A × A, which is denoted by R. Profile of the preference is defined as follows: x assigns a preference x(k) to all agent k ∈ N . For any dip x(i), let τ 1 (R x(i) ) denote the set of all top ranked alternatives according to R x(i) .
In this setting, a decision rule φ assigns an outcome φ(x) ∈ A to every preference profile x. Correspondingly, the precise way of expressing the three properties on φ is introduced below.
Call rule φ
• Strategy-proof if no agent can gain by unilaterally misreporting his preference. In other words, for all k ∈ N , φ(x)R x(i) φ(x ) for any x, x ∈ R such that x(N \ {k}) = x (N \ {k})
• Unanimous if for any preference profile (
• Anonymous if for every permutation π : N → N and for every preference profile
In the next section, an in-depth analysis on internal solutions is presented.
Internal solutions
In this section, it is shown how a strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous rule selects an inner solution. In order to define and prove the lemmas, the following cases are considered:
and get better off with (1, 1) by Lemma 1, leading to a violation of strategy-proofness. Similarly, if a or b ∈ (0, 2x(i)), then strategy-proofness does not hold because of Lemma 2. Hence, a, b / ∈ (2x(j) − 1, 1) and a, b / ∈ (0, 2x(i)). Now consider 2x(i) ≤ a, b ≤ 2x(j) − 1 which is shown in Figure 1 . This implies 2x(i) ≤ 2x(j)−1 leading to
. This contradicts the assumption that x ∈ R 3 . Hence,
Proof. From Lemma 3, φ(x) can be (0, 0), (0, 1) or (1, 1). Suppose φ(x) = (0, 0). This outcome is the worst from the three alternatives for agent i whose dip is x(i) < . Then, for any x (i), φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 0) by strategy-proofness. According to x(j) and x (j), (0, 0) is the top ranked alternative. Then, φ(x (i), x (j)) = (0, 0) for similar reason by strategy-proofness. Now assume that φ(x) = (0, 1). φ(x (i), x(j)) = (1, 1) is not possible as agent i would deviate his dip from x(i) to x (i) and be better off. Also, φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 0) cannot be an outcome as the agent i would misreport his dip from x (i) to x(i) in order to be better off. Thus, φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 1). Now the outcome for two different dips of agent j are compared, namely x(j) and
Finally, it can also be shown that if φ(x) = (1, 1), then φ(x (i), x (j)) = (1, 1) for any profile (x (i), x (j)) for the similar reason as above.
The Lemmas 1, 2, 3 show that for any profile in R 1 , R 2 and R 3 , a strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous rule cannot choose inner point. In addition, Lemma 4 shows that, such a rule is constant over all x ∈ R 3 Lemma 5. If x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (0, a), then there exists a x ∈ R 4 such that φ(x ) = (0, a), x (i) > 0, x (j) < 1 and 0 < a < 1 Proof. Suppose x(i) = 0 and x(j) = 1. Consider deviation from x(i) to x (i) where
. Then, by strategy proofness, φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, a) as any other outcome would incentivise agent i to deviate. Now suppose φ(x (i), x (j)) = (α, β). In addition, consider deviation from x(j) to x (j) where 3+a 4 < x (j). If β < a, then it is beneficial to misreport for agent j. Now, consider deviation from x (j) to x(j). If β > a, then it is more preferred to misreport for agent j. Hence, β = a. By lexmin preference, α = 0.
Proof. This is similar as the proof for Lemma 5.
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. Existence of such x (i) and x(j) is guaranteed through Lemma 5. Then by Lemma 3, φ(x (i), x(j)) can be (0, 0), (0, 1) or (1, 1). This leads to the following three cases that need to be examined:
Case 1 First, assume φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 1), then agent i misreports his dip from x(i) to x (i). He benefits through deviating which violates strategy-proofness.
Case 2 Similarly, if φ(x (i), x(j)) = (1, 1), then agent i deviates his dip from x(i) to x (i) violating strategy-proofness.
. Hence, the profile (x (j), x (i)) ∈ R 3 . Then, by the Lemma 4, φ(x (i), x (j)) = (0, 0). Now consider the profile (x (i), x(j)), then φ(x (i), x(j)) must be equal to j's top ranked alternative (0, 0), otherwise deviation x(j) → x (j) is beneficial for agent j.
But then, agent i can deviate from x (i) to x(i) violating strategy-proofness. Hence, φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 0).
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 6.
Lemmas 6 and 7 show that if x ∈ R 4 , inner solutions (0, a) and (b, 1) where 0 < a, b < 1 cannot be chosen. However, for any profile in R 4 , the specific type of inner solution (b, c), where 0 < b, c < 1, can be selected. This is shown in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. If for a profile x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (a, b), then 2x(i) < a, b < 2x(j) − 1.
Proof. Note that, if a < 2x(i) (or b > 2x(j) − 1), then i (or j) can deviate to 1 2 and be better off. So suppose a = 2x(i),
. This is depicted in Figure 2 . Consider deviation from x(i) to x (i). Then, φ(x (i), x(j)) can take the value (0, 0), (0, 1) or (1, 1) by Lemma 3. More specifically, the following three cases have to be addressed:
Case 1 Suppose φ(x (i), x(j)) = (1, 1) which is agent i's top ranked alternative. Thus, he would deviate from x(i) to x (i) violating strategy-proofness.
Case 2 Suppose φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 0). By Lemma 4, for any profile in R 3 , the outcome is (0, 0). Hence, the outcome for the profile (x(i), x (j)) such that x (j) > is also (0, 0). This gives agent j an opportunity to deviate from x(j) to x (j) and get his top ranked alternative violating strategy-proofness. Similarly, it can be shown that b = 2x(j) − 1. Proof. Suppose φ(x) = (a, b) for some x ∈ R 4 . Next, it is shown in the following two cases that φ(x ) / ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)} by contradiction.
Case 1 Suppose φ(x ) = (0, 0) where x ∈ R 3 . For agent j, (0, 0) is the top ranked alternative. Consider the deviation from x(j) to x (j) such that x (j) > . So, the profile (x(i), x (j)) ∈ R 3 . Hence, by Lemma 4, φ(x(i), x (j)) = (0, 0). Thus, deviation from x(j) to x (j) is beneficial for agent j as he prefers (0, 0) over (a, b). . So, the profile (x (i), x(j)) ∈ R 3 . Hence, by Lemma 4, φ(x (i), x(j)) = (1, 1). Thus, deviation from x(i) to x (i) is better off for agent i as he prefers (1, 1) over (a, b).
Hence, this shows that φ(x ) / ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}. As x ∈ R 3 , by Lemma 3 φ(x ) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. Hence, it follows that φ(x ) = (0, 1).
Lemma 9 states that the rule φ selects the alternative (0, 1) for any profile x ∈ R 3 , if an inner point is selected for some profile x ∈ R 4 . Lemma 10. If x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (0, 0), then there exists a x such that φ(x ) = (0, 0) with . Note that (0, 0) is the worst alternative with respect to x(i) = 0. Then by strategy-proofness, φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 0), otherwise agent i will deviate from x(i) to x (i) and get better off. Now consider deviation of agent j, in other words x(j) → x (j). Since (0, 0) is the top ranked alternative for both x(j) and x (j), the rule cannot choose anything else than (0, 0) for the profile (x (i), x (j)). Hence, φ(x (i), x (j)) = (0, 0) Corollary 2. If x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (1, 1), then there exists a x ∈ R 4 such that φ(x ) = (1, 1),
Proof. This is similar as the proof for Lemma 10.
Lemma 11. If x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (a, b), then φ(x ) ∈ {(a, b), (0, 1)} for any x ∈ R 4 .
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Proof. Suppose φ(x) = (a, b) for some x ∈ R 4 . Following this, it is shown that φ(x ) / ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)} for any x ∈ R 4 . Proposition 1. φ(x ) / ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)} for any x ∈ R 4 .
Proof of Proposition 1. This proposition is proven by contradiction as follows.
Case 1 Suppose φ(x ) = (0, 0). Due to Lemma 10, it is possible to assume that 0 < x (i) < . Hence, profile (x (i), x (j)) ∈ R 3 . Since φ(x) = (a, b), by Lemma 9, φ(x (i), x (j)) = (0, 1). This creates an opportunity for agent i to misreport and benefit. Hence, φ(x ) = (0, 0) is not possible.
Case 2 Suppose φ(x ) = (1, 1). This case is similar to the previous case, except agent j's deviation is considered and Corollary 2 in order to get the contradiction.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
Now it is shown that φ(x ) ∈ {(a, b), (0, 1)} for any x ∈ R 4 . First the profile (x (i), x(j)) is considered. Hence, the following cases are considered:
Case 2 If (x (i), x(j)) ∈ R 4 , then by Lemma 6, 7 and Proposition 1 φ( 
Case 2a Consider x (i) < x(i)
. This is shown in Figure 3 . By strategy-proofness, the closest outcome with respect to x (i) is in [0, a] but not in (0, a). Hence, the closest outcome must be a. By lexmin preference, the furthest outcome also stays at b. Now agent j moves. From the previous cases it follows that φ(x (i), x(j)) ∈ {(0, 1), (a, b)}. Hence, two cases are considered:
Case 1a Consider x(j) < x (j). This is shown in Figure 5 . By strategy-proofness, the closest outcome with respect to x (j) is in [b, 1] but not in (b, 1). Hence, the closest outcome must be b. By lexmin preference, the furthest outcome also stays at a. Case 1b Now the case x (j) < x(j) is taken into account which is depicted in Figure 6 . Suppose φ(x ) = (a 2 , b 2 ) for some (a 2 , b 2 ) ∈ A. As x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (a, b), Lemmas 6, 7 and Proposition 1 implies that either (a 2 , b 2 ) = (0, 1), or 0 < a 2 ≤ b 2 < 1. Now suppose that 0 < a 2 ≤ b 2 < 1. It is shown that (a 2 , b 2 ) = (a, b). Consider deviation from x(j) to x (j). Strategyproofness implies that either a 2 or b 2 is in the interval [b, 1] . Similarly, for the other way deviation, strategy-proofness implies that neither a 2 nor b 2 is in the interval (b, 2x (j) − b). Due to Lemma 8, it follows that d < 2x (j) − 1. As 0 < a 2 ≤ b 2 < 1, 2x (j) − 1 ≥ b. Then it follows that b 2 = b. This in turn implies, because of lexmin preferences and strategy-proofness that a 2 = a. So it is concluded that if φ(
Case 2 φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 1). In this case, φ(x ) = (a 3 , b 3 ), where either (a 3 , b 3 ) = (0, 1) or 0 < a 3 ≤ b 3 < 1. This is due to Lemmas 6, 7 and Proposition 1. Consider deviation from x(j) to x (j), then strategy-proofness implies that either a 3 or b 3 is in the interval [2x(j) − 1, 1]. Consider deviation from x (j) to x(j), then strategyproofness implies that neither a 3 nor b 3 is in the interval (2x (j) − 1, 1). Now the following cases are considered.
Case 2a Suppose x (j) < x(j) which is illustrated in Figure 7 . Then b 3 = 1. This implies that φ(x ) = (0, 1).
Case 2b Assume x (j) > x(j) which is shown in Figure 8 . Then
. Now consider the deviations in the following sequence: So it is concluded that if φ(x (i), x(j)) = (0, 1), then φ(x ) = (0, 1).
Combining these cases, concludes the proof of Lemma 11.
Lemma 11 shows that if a strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous rule selects an inner point for some profile in R 4 , then that rule selects either the same inner point or (0, 1) for all other profile in R 4 .
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Generalized Example
This section determines and presents the complete characterization of a set of strategyproof, anonymous and unanimous rules for finding inner solutions for optimal locating of the public bads. Let y 1 (x) := min{x(i), x(j)} and y 2 (x) := max{x(i), x(j)}. For any given a, b ∈ (0, 1), define rule h (a,b) in the following way: Proof. Note that from the definition of h (a,b) , it follows that the rule is anonymous. First of all, it is shown that this rule is unanimous.
, which is shown in Figure 9 . If x(i) < , then agent i's and j's top ranked alternatives are (1, 1). Thus, the set of common top ranked alternative is τ 1 (R x(i) ) ∩ τ 1 (R x(j) ) = (1, 1). If x(i) = , then agent i's and j's top ranked alternatives are (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). This leads to τ 1 (R x(i) ) ∩ τ 1 (R x(j) ) = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. The rule selects (1, 1). For the cases x(i) < resulting in τ 1 (R x(i) ) ∩ τ 1 (R x(j) ) = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}, the rule chooses (1, 1). Hence, in this case the rule does not violate unanimity. . It is observed that the rule chooses an element of τ 1 (R x(i) ) ∩ τ 1 (R x(j) ), that is (0, 0). Thus, there is no violation of unanimity.
Case 3. Suppose the rule chooses (a, b) if 2y 1 < a ≤ b < 2y 2 − 1, or equivalently,
< y 2 . Assume without loss of generality, x(i) ≤ x(j). Then y 1 = x(i) and y 2 = x(j). Furthermore, x(i) < 
< x(j)
This leads to the result that agent i's and j's top ranked alternative are (1, 1) and (0, 0), respectively. The unanimity condition does not apply as τ 1 (R x(i) ) ∩ τ 1 (R x(j) ) = ∅.
Case 4. In this case, the following is possible: a < 2y 1 < 1 and 2y 2 −1 > b or a ≤ 2y 1 < 1 and 0 ≤ 2y 2 − 1 ≤ b or 2y 1 ≤ a and 0 < 2y 2 − 1 ≤ b.
Below the reader finds Figure 11 that depicts the situation. Hence, as for all cases the rule chooses τ 1 (R x(i) ) ∩ τ 1 (R x(j) ), where applicable. Thus, the rule satisfy the condition for the unanimity property.
Finally, it is shown that the rule is strategy-proof. First, Case 1 is considered. Since agent i and j are already getting their top alternative (1, 1), they have no incentive to misreport. Similarly, I come to the same conclusion for Case 2. Now consider case 3 and assume without loss of generality x(i) < x(j), then 2x(i) < a ≤ b < 2x(j) − 1. Deviation from this profile can result in outcomes (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). Consider deviation of player i. Player i himself cannot ensure the outcome (1, 1) as x(j) > Hence, the rule satisfy the condition for strategy-proofness. To conclude, the rule is strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous. Note that the rule h (a,b) (x) contains one internal solution, that is, for a given (a, b) if 2y 1 (x) < a ≤ b < 2y 2 (x) − 1.
Key Findings and Conclusions
The key findings of the present thesis are summarised with the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Suppose φ be a rule. Then φ is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and selects inner points if and only if φ = h (a,b) for some a, b ∈ (0, 1) such that a ≤ b.
Proof. The only if-case follows from Theorem 1. In addition, the if-case follows from Lemmas 1 to 11.
Based on lexmin preference of the concerned agents for locating pairs of public bads, the present thesis has defined and proved eleven lemmas determining the implications of the properties, strategy-proofness, anonymity and unanimity on the decision rule. In addition, it has shown that the combination of these properties allows for inner solutions.
In Figure 14 , the preference domain is partitioned as follows: As noted in Section 2, R 1 , R 2 , R 3 and R 4 represent the different combinations of the locations of dips of the agents i and j, denoted as x(i) and x(j) respectively. The alternatives that the rule chooses for the specific partition are defined in the brackets. The following observations are made: In R 1 , R 2 and R 3 the decision rule chooses no internal solution. However, an alternative where both public bads are inside the interval can be selected from the rule. Furthermore, if there exists a profile x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (a, b), where 0 < a, b < 1, then for any profile x ∈ R 3 , φ(x ) = (0, 1). The reader should also note that in R 4 , the decision rule can also choose a boundary point. Hence, if there exists a profile x ∈ R 4 and φ(x) = (0, 1), then for any profile x ∈ R 3 , φ(x ) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. 
